The objective of this paper is to estimate the impacts of long-and mediumterm duration in micro…nance program participation. It utilises a new, large and unique household-level panel dataset collected on 1997/98 treatment and control households, spanning about 8 years. The data enables us to identify continuing participants in the program as well as newcomers and leavers. We employ di¤er-ent estimation strategies including triple-di¤erence and propensity score matching methods to control for selection bias. The impact estimates indicate that the bene…ts from micro…nance vary more than proportionately with the duration of participation in a program. Larger bene…ts are realized from longer-term participation, and that the bene…ts continue to accrue beyond the departure from the program. The …ndings indicate the need to observe the longer-term program participation to provide a reliable basis for assessing the e¢ cacy of micro…nance lending.
1 Using cross-section data, Pitt and Khandker (1998) …nd that micro…nance signi…cantly increases consumption expenditure, reduces poverty, and increases non-land assets. They use a land-based eligibility criterion as the instrument for program participation. Morduch (1998) , using the same dataset but a di¤erent estimation strategy (di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach), …nds that microcredit has insigni…cant or even negative e¤ects on the same measures of outcomes that Pitt and Khandker examine. Islam (2008) …nds micro…nance helps to increase consumption for the relatively poor, however, the e¤ect is small. In the case of Thailand, Coleman (1999) …nds that average program impact on assets, savings, expenditure on education and health care is insigni…cant. On the other hand, Kaboski and Townsend (2005) , using retrospective time-series data, …nd that membership in certain types of institutions can have positive impact on asset growth and consumption in Thailand. Karlan and Zinman (2008) examine the impact of expanding access to consumer credit using data from …eld experiment in South Africa. They use individual randomization of the marginal clients and the results from surveys following 6-12 months of the experiment indicate signi…cant and positive e¤ects on income, food consumption, and job retention. Banerjee at al. (2009) report results of a randomized evaluation 15 to 18 months after the introduction of the program. They …nd no e¤ect of access to credit on average consumption. Khandker (2005) , using panel data, …nds results much more muted than the results based on the cross-sectional data reported in Pitt and Khandker (1998). pact. In the short-run, as they argued, it is possible that some households are cutting back consumption to enable greater investment that might make them signi…cantly richer and increase consumption in the long-run. In this paper, I report, for the …rst time, the sensitivity of the impact of the micro…nance program with respect to the length of participation in a program. The objective is to distinguish the short-term participation e¤ects from the medium-and long-term e¤ects. Potential larger impact of micro…nance is realized in short-term participation if there are increasing returns to capital in household enterprises. On the other hand, many households may not obtain the potential return until they invest su¢ cient sums of money. Typically, it takes a member several years to establish a trustworthy reputation with the MFI that is required to obtain larger loans.
Di¤ering investments will have di¤ering time horizons in their returns'pro…le. Therefore, …ndings of the short-term evaluations may not provide reliable assessment of the overall impact of the microcredit program. Evaluating micro…nance programs based on data over a substantial period of time could improve our understanding of the contribution that micro…nance programs may make to the growth and development process.
However, studying the impact of prolonged participation in a micro…nance program requires researchers to observe households over a signi…cant period. Recent availability of eight-year monitoring and follow-up data o¤ers an opportunity to examine important questions about longer-term participation impacts of micro…nance program. We use four waves of a panel dataset of treatment and control groups of micro…nance households. The survey encompasses about 3,000 households from 91 villages over the period 1997/98-2004/05 . An important motivation to evaluate this program is the dataset which I administered and collected, and my experience working with micro…nance clients.
An ideal evaluation would have all clients from the …rst round remain in the program throughout while no control household receives the treatment at any stage of the program.
However, some treated households dropped out, and some control households joined. So, if we treat initial participants and comparison groups as treated and non-treated, the treatment/control di¤erential would likely to be underestimated. Since the dataset contains information regarding participation status of households for each year during the survey period, we are able to identify latecomers and households who continued their participation for at least eight years. Thus, we are able to distinguish between new par-ticipants and stayers. Becuase entry into the program and the timing of the particpation are not random, we compare the changes in outcome at baseline and outcome after (at least two years) participation in the program. The existence of these households in the survey enable us to estimate the treatment e¤ect depending on the length of exposure to the program. There are also households who departed from the program at some point during the study period. We track these drop-outs for up to eight years following their exit from the program. Using the latter households ("leavers"), we examine if the bene…ts received by participants continue after leaving the program. We are thus able to estimate the lasting impact of the program. This could help us to understand what might have happened when a member leaves the program.
We address the concern regarding the selection bias which are common to non-experimental program evaluation. We consider a variety of approaches to identify the di¤erent treatment e¤ects, and to check the robustness of our results. At …rst, we employ standard panel data models such as the double-di¤erence (DD) approach and …xed e¤ects model. We then combine the …xed e¤ects method and the propensity score matching (PSM) method of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) . We thus control for observable and time-invariant unobservable household and village characteristics, and minimize the di¤erences in the distribution between treated and non-treated households. In order to allow for timevarying unobserved household-speci…c di¤erences, we use the random growth model (see Ashenfelter and Card 1985, Heckman and Hotz 1989) , and also combine this method with the PSM method. However, if there are shocks or changes speci…c to treatment villages that have nothing to do with the program or if there are other changes in these villages then our estimates will still be biased. Therefore, we re…ne our empirical strategy by exploiting control groups and the land-based eligibility criterion, and use a triple-di¤erence (DDD) approach. 2 We also use a regression framework of the DDD method to control for observed characteristics.
2 Micro…nance in Bangladesh is targeted at households who are eligible (although this is not strictly enforced). There are both eligible and non-eligible households in treatment and control villages. Therefore, we can estimate the impact of micro…nance on those targeted (eligible households) by using tripledi¤erence: the di¤erence between double-di¤erence estimates for eligible and ineligible households. The use of land-based eligibility criterion is subject to debate in the context of micro…nance in Bangladesh, and we address this issue in section 4. Unlike previous studies (such as Pitt and Khandker 1998) we use a di¤erent cut-o¤ point for eligibilty based on personal observation from working with the micro…nance households at the …eld level.
We obtain the impact estimates of long-term participation based on at least eight years of continuing participation in a program. Estimates obtained for newcomers are interpreted as short-or medium-term impacts, depending on the length of their exposure to the programs. Similarly, medium or long-run impacts are identi…ed using leavers.
3 We look at the impact on changes in self-employment income, other income, food and nonfood consumption expenditure and assets. The main …nding of this paper is that the gains from micro…nance programs vary with the duration of participation. The results show that the larger bene…ts accrue from longer-term participation. They also indicate that bene…ts may continue after the end of participation in a program but that such bene…ts are likely to be short-lived. The estimation results suggest that extrapolation using short-term participation data in the micro…nance program may yield biased conclusions regarding the overall impact of the program. Our results are robust to corrections for various sources of selection bias including the timing of participation, and staying and leaving the program. The results from this study could provide a way to understand the impact of di¤erent duration of participation in micro…nance, and present a tentative time path of graduation from poverty. Our approach to estimate the impacts of di¤erent lengths of program participation appears to be a signi…cant contribution to the literature, as it rests on observation rather than extrapolation.
The Survey and the Data
The paper uses data from the surveys conducted by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) and Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF, Rural Employment Support Foundation) for the purposes of evaluating micro…nance programs in Bangladesh.
The data covers both treatment and control groups of microcredit households. The …rst survey was administered after a census of all households in the 91 villages during October 1997. The survey encompasses 23 sub-districts of 13 of Bangladesh's 64 districts. One aim of survey was to capture a representative sample of micro…nance households that re‡ects the overall microcredit operations in Bangladesh. The participating households were drawn from 13 di¤erent sizes of MFIs (so as to be representative of MFIs in Bangladesh), each from separate districts. All these MFI are member of PKSF. 4 These MFIs have similar types of program activities and provide loans in a similar way to the Grameen Bank.
Most of the clients in our sample are women, and credit is not o¤ered to a mixed group of men and women together. Of the 13 selected MFIs, two were deliberately chosen from the four largest MFIs in Bangladesh. The survey was designed initially to have two control villages and six treatment villages from each of the areas where micro…nance was operating. However, since not enough control villages could be found in all areas, only a total of 11 control villages were included in the …rst round. Subsequent rounds of the survey revealed that some of the control villages turned into program villages, and in the …nal round of survey there were 8 control villages. 5 Because of the absence of adequate number of control villages, non-clients from the treatment villages were also surveyed based on observable characteristics reported in the census. The household dataset is strati…ed, and clustered at the village level.
While four rounds of the survey were conducted (in 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2004-05) , we mainly use data from the …rst, third and fourth round because the second round did not collect comprehensive information on outcome variables such as consumption and income. 6 All surveys took place during December to April. The …rst and third waves consisted of 3,026 and 2,939 households, respectively, and the …nal wave had 2,729
households from the same number of villages. The attrition rate over 1997-2005 was less than 10 percent: about 1.2 percent per calendar year. We study a balanced panel of 2,694 households to compare outcomes over time (we delete 35 observations because of missing data on some key variables). The survey has di¤erent modules for household socioeconomic condition, micro…nance participation, village-and MFI-level information.
The household dataset has several strengths. The data is comprehensive and covers information on all major socioeconomic conditions of households. There is detailed household 4 PKSF works as a regulatory organization for the MFIs. The microlending community regards it as a regulatory agency and it exercises authority over the MFIs. PKSF mobilizes funds from a wide variety of sources and provides these funds to its members for lending as microcredit.
5 Khandker (2005) also highlights the limitation of getting control villages in his survey data. 6 One reason to have a follow-up survey in 2004-05 after a gap of more than 4 years was to obtain impact estimates for those dropped-out and participated newly. So, an e¤ort was made to obtain detail information on participation status during this interval. We have year-to-year information about household participation status for other years when there was no survey. The author was also personally involved in the last wave of data collection, monitoring and report writing. information on income (from di¤erent sources and categories), possession, ownership, sales and purchases of all assets, expenditure on food and non-food items, and so on. It also records data on loan use, the amount borrowed, the duration of the membership. The descriptive statistics of key demographic variables for di¤erent survey rounds are given in the top panel of Table 1 .
Observation units have not remained stable during the time period of the panel. Many of the clients dropped out of the program after one or more years, and some of the control households became clients in later waves. However, drop-outs from the program and newcomers into the program were also interviewed during each survey. Some splitting up of the original households also took place due to demographic transition. We found that 116 households split up during the 1999/2000 round of survey, while 184 households had split up by the 2004/05 survey. The survey followed most of the members of split-up households who were also re-interviewed. We merged the split-up households with the original one to form a single household. The splitting up is not a major issue in this study, as there is very little migration outside of the village.
Attrition
Here we examine whether there is any attrition bias even though the attrition rate from the survey is low compared to many other panel dataset from developing countries. Attrition bias arises if the variables that a¤ect the probability of attrition have a non-zero correlation with the error term of an outcome equation with a sample that has been reduced by attrition. The sample comparison of means of demographic and other socioeconomic variables reveal that the attritors are not signi…cantly di¤erent from the stayers. There are 147 attritors from treated households and 184 from control households in all three waves. Thus, the attrition rate is higher among the non-clients. However, a comparison of means of the attritors in terms of their demographic variables reveals no signi…cant di¤erence between clients and non-clients (see Table 8 ). In results not reported here we do not reject the hypothesis of the equality of the two distributions for any demographic variable using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. In the spirit of Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Mo¢ t (1998) we also began with an explanation of the correlates of attrition in our survey.
We estimate a probit model of overall attrition, and attrition by participation status in the …rst round using a lagged demographic variable for the current round's attrition. We also test the equality of the regression coe¢ cients for stayers and for attritors. We did not …nd any signi…cant di¤erences in the covariates that have a very strong correlation with future non-response. The full set of attrition results are available from the author upon request. 7 The evidence is that any selection bias from attrition is not a problem in the present study. Moreover, we employ an estimation strategy which can resolve many potential biases (including attrition bias) that are due to unobservables. 
Outcomes of Interest and Descriptives
We are mainly interested in evaluating the impact on household income, consumption and assets. Self-employment income is of particular interest to us since microcredit programs are intended to enhance self-employment activities. We de…ne self-employment income as the sum of the proceeds from all of the household's self-employment activities minus operating expenses (excluding the value of household's own labor). We also estimate the impact on "other income," much of which comes from some form of productive activity (households may buy a cow for agricultural activity or as an investment). Moreover, money is fungible and there is substitutability between capital: households borrowing from MFI can transfer their own assets and savings to other activities, and hence pave the way to invest in multiple and diversi…ed projects. As a result, we compute "total income"from a wide range of sources.
Since income may produce "noisy" data, particularly in a developing country, we also consider alternative measures to evaluate the bene…ts from micro…nance. Poor households in Bangladesh spend a signi…cant part of their income on food. We have information about 200 commodities consumed for a given period prior to each round of survey. Consumption expenditure data include expenditures of food consumed in the reference period. The information covers a wide range and types (e.g. food purchased, home produced) of food 7 Studies that use longitudinal data from both developed (see Journal of Human Resources 1998 spring issue) and developing countries (Thomas, Frankenberg and Smith (2001) for IFLS data; Falaris (2003) for LSMS data from Peru, Cote d'Ivoire and Vietnam) …nd that even if demographic variables for attritors and stayers are di¤erent, and there are selective mechanisms working for attrition, the e¤ects of attrition on parameter estimates are mild or non-existent. 8 We also experiment, in the next section, with the most common approach of taking account of attrition bias in our regression estimation. We give weight to each observation by the inverse of the probability of staying in the sample, and carry out our estimation. The results are similar with or without weighting. consumption, and is as good as the standard LSMS food consumption module. We also include non-food expenditure as an outcome of interest. The non-food expenditure data includes items such as kerosene, batteries, soap, housing repairs, clothing, schooling and health expenditures, and excludes unusual items such as dowries, weddings, legal costs, etc. The data for non-food consumption expenditure was collected for di¤erent recall periods, depending on how frequently the items concerned are typically purchased. We construct non-food expenditure to a uniform reference period of one year. Together with food expenditure, consumption expenditure provides an alternative measure of household welfare. Finally, many households can save in the form of durable and non-durable assets, and also many households buy assets (such as livestock) using credit. Therefore, we measure the impact on total non-land assets of households, also excluding the value of the house.
We de ‡ate the outcome variables by rural household agricultural index which is set to 1997-98 = 100. To exclude the e¤ect of a few very large outliers, we exclude those households reporting unreasonably high or low values of the above outcome variables (although this did not signi…cantly a¤ect the results). Table 1 reports the results of the outcome and loan variables for di¤erent years. Table 1 427, 10; 616, and 11; 682 for 1997-98, 1999-2000 and 2004-05, respectively. 9 There are two major concerns for evaluating the impacts of micro…nance at the household level. First, MFIs choose to provide credit in particular villages. For example, it could be the case that poorer villages get priority for micro…nance. Alternatively, the decision to provide services might come about because of strong demand from a local community.
Second, households within the program villages self-select into the program. It is likely that the decision to participate in a program is driven by households'need for credit or the perceived bene…t from such credit. As a result, participation into the microcredit program may not be orthogonal to unobservable factors that also a¤ect the outcome of interest. Impact evaluation of micro…nance therefore requires controlling for selection bias. 9 The availability of panel data allows us to address the selection bias, and to avoid restrictive assumptions that are common in a cross-sectional data. Besides, we adopt estimation methodologies which further relax many of the identifying assumptions (e.g., time invariant unobservables) that are typical in a panel data estimation.
At the outset, we consider the Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence (DD) approach which ensures that any variable that remains constant over time (but are unobserved) and is correlated with the participation decision and the outcome variable will not bias the estimated effect. The pre-treatment characteristics that are likely to be associated with the outcome variables over time may be unbalanced between treatment and control groups. Therefore, we include controls so that the di¤erences in age, gender, household size, etc. are controlled and the di¤erence between treatment and control groups over time re ‡ect the causal e¤ect. We use the following regression-adjusted DD model which can be speci…ed as the following …xed e¤ects linear regression model:
where Y ijlt is the outcome of interest, e.g., consumption expenditure or income, for household i living in village j in a micro…nance area l at period t (expressed logarithmically except for the self-employment income). D it is the treatment variable that takes on (i) the amount of credit borrowed from a MFI until period t ; and (ii) the value of 1 if a household receives treatment from a MFI in period t and 0 otherwise. X it is a vector of household-speci…c control variables, G j is village …xed e¤ects which eliminates the problem if programs were placed non-randomly, i is …xed e¤ects unique to household i, t is a period e¤ect common to all households in period t, l is the MFI/district-level …xed e¤ects. Household-level …xed e¤ects method also resolve any village or any upper (e.g., district) level unobserved heterogeneity. The error term " ijlt is household's transitory shock that has mean zero for each period t = 1; 2; 3 and is assumed to be distributed independently of the treatment status D it .
The errors might be correlated across time and space. When treatment e¤ects are constant within aggregate units, we must allow for errors to be correlated within the aggregate level. For example, Bertrand, Du ‡o and Mullainathan (2004) and Donald and Lang (2007) demonstrate that there can be pervasive serial correlation in household level di¤erence models that can severely downward bias the standard error estimates.
We therefore need to adjust the latter for the correlated errors. We compute standard errors clustered at the village-year level to allow for an arbitrary covariance structure within villages over time. Donald and Lang (2007) have pointed out that asymptotic justi…cation of this estimator assumes a large number of aggregate units. Simulations in Bertrand, Du ‡o and Mullainathan (2004) show the cluster-correlated Huber-White estimator performs poorly when the number of clusters is small (<50), leading to overrejection of the null hypothesis of no e¤ect. Since we have 91 clusters in our sample, we can potentially avoid this problem. In addition, we also report standard errors using block bootstrapping, as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004) , when the number of groups is su¢ ciently large.
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Equation (1) is somewhat restrictive because it assumes that the selection bias is due to (i) an unobserved household speci…c component ( i ) that is …xed over time, or (ii) observed di¤erences between treatment and control groups that are due to X, and in the absence of program participation = 0:In the following speci…cation, we assume that there is a household-speci…c …xed e¤ect and a household-speci…c time trend. The model, known as a random growth model (see Ashenfelter and Card 1985, Heckman and Hotz 1989) , takes the …xed e¤ects model a step further by allowing unobserved household di¤erences that change at a …xed rate over time during the period of analysis. We specify the model as:
where Y ijlt is the natural log of the outcome of interest. Thus, i can be interpreted as the average growth rate over a period (holding other covariates …xed). Equation (2) allows for household-speci…c outcome growth that is the same for all periods. Adding i t to the set of covariates also accounts for di¤erential trends between treatment and control groups.
We may eliminate household …xed e¤ects by di¤erencing the dependent variable. With a simple modi…cation, we express the …rst-di¤erenced model in the following form:
This model eliminates the selection bias that results from household-speci…c …xed e¤ects and the household-speci…c time trend. This modi…cation allows past loans to have an e¤ect on a household's current consumption, income and assets because we are using the level of credit, as opposed to its …rst-di¤erence, as the variable of interest. Since …rst di¤erencing the right-hand side variable will mean losing more variables (if we estimate …xed e¤ects on di¤erenced variables we eliminate many of our variables of interest (linear time trend variable)) that a¤ect the growth in outcomes, we use the level of variables such as education, gender, marital status of the household head, etc. Equation (3) is then just the standard unobserved e¤ects model. This means we can apply …xed e¤ects methods to estimate the treatment e¤ect. In the actual estimation strategy, we also incorporate time dummies in equation (3) which allow to control further aggregate changes. 
Results: Fixed E¤ects and Random Growth Model
The …xed e¤ect regression results using equation (1) are given in columns (1) & (2) of Table 2 . Since treatment assignment is not randomized, we also report results based on the matching method. In particular, we match households from treated and non-treated 11 An advantage of models such as equation (1-3) is that they are robust with choice-based sampling which characterizes most non-experimental datasets, such as the dataset used in this study. groups based on their observed characteristics that determine whether a household participates or not in a micro…nance program. To do so, we estimate propensity score of participating in a micro…nance program (see Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) . The details of the matching procedure are given in the next section. The results indicate that micro…-nance can increase self-employment income, consumption, and assets of households. The largest impact observed is on self-employment income, and the lowest is on food consumption (when we consider matched sample). Table 2 shows that treated households are able to increase food consumption by 1:9 percent, non-food consumption by 3 percent, and assets by 4:85 percent. The point estimate for "other income" is negative and insigni…-cant -only 0:77 percent. We use a random-e¤ect Tobit model (since a …xed-e¤ect Tobit model is biased and inconsistent) to estimate the treatment e¤ect on self-employment income as there are zeros in many cases. The coe¢ cient estimates indicate that household self-employment income increases by 14:7 taka by borrowing 100 taka from a MFI. The statistical signi…cance of the results is not a¤ected by the particular standard error (block bootstrapping or clustering by village-year level) we consider. So, we report results using clustering at the village-year level.
Results for the random growth model (equation 3) are given in columns (3) & (4) of Table 2 . We …nd results similar to that of …xed e¤ects estimation except in the case of "other income". Column (4) indicates that non-food consumption is increased by 4:3 percent, and other income by 6:5 percent. The estimated increase in food consumption and assets are 0:47 percent and 4:9 percent, respectively, for households in the treatment group. The coe¢ cient estimates from the random-e¤ect Tobit model indicate that a 100 taka increase in borrowing from a MFI will add 31:7 taka to household income. The estimated coe¢ cients from random growth model are larger than that of …xed e¤ects model.
There are many clients of the micro…nance we study here who dropped out later from the program. It also appears from the data that some control group members joined in the program later (after 1997/98 survey took place). So, some households are being partially treated when considering the entire survey period. In the presence of partial treatment, the estimator provides an estimate of assignment of the treatment rather than of the mean impact of the treatment itself (Heckman, Smith and Taber 1998) . It is likely that our estimate is smaller than we would obtain in the absence of exit from the program or entry into the program. Below we consider an approach that can identify the impact of partial treatment separately from the impact of the full treatment on the fully treated. 12 4 Other Evaluation Strategies
Triple-di¤erence Matching Estimate
Our identi…cation strategy in the last section assumes that there is no shock to the outcomes of the treatment and control groups contemporaneously to the program. That may be a strong identi…cation assumption, and any pre-program level di¤erence between treatment and control groups may account for relative shifts in the outcome of interest. Thus, we control for di¤erent relative shocks a¤ecting households in treatment and control villages by using a triple-di¤erence strategy. Micro…nance in Bangladesh is typically o¤ered to households who are eligible 13 in a program village 14 . Therefore, the potentially unaffected ineligible households from treatment and control villages can be used to di¤erence away any relative trend in the treatment and control groups correlated with unobserved variables, but not due to participation in the program. Thus, we can use a method that involves using a double-di¤erence estimate for eligible and ineligible households. In essence, this entails a triple-di¤erence: double-di¤erence estimate for eligible households, minus a double-di¤erence estimate for ineligible households. Ineligible households are not a¤ected by the program, and the programs do not target them. In our sample about 17 percent 12 Heckman, Smith and Taber (1998) consider evaluation of the program using an instrumental variable (IV) approach to control the self-selection problem in such a case. Fortunately, with the availabilty of panel dataset, we do not need to worry about …nding a suitable instrument to identify the impact of the treatment. Instead,we combine matching and DD approaches to control for observed and unobserved di¤erences between treatment and comparison groups (see Heckman, Smith, and Todd 1998) . 13 The micro…nance institutions in our study set the o¢ cial eligibility rule as households having less than 50 decimals of land in order to target the poorer households. By that criterion, a large number of non-eligible households (30-40 percent, depending on the survey year) received the treatment. Discussions with local branch managers and …eld level o¢ cials of MFIs indicate that they treat households holding marginally more land with ‡exibly (on the grounds that land quality and price are not the same in every region, lack of perfect information about the borrowers'ownership of land, etc.). Also over time, MFIs relaxed the eligibility rule to expand their coverage in a growing competitive environment of microlending organizations. The survey asked households about the eligibility criterion, and many households reported that they are eligible if they hold less than one acre of land. Therefore, we adopt the eligibility criterion of households having less than one acre of land. According to this criterion, about 83 percent of the participants in 1997-98 are eligible.
14 Microcredit lenders do not lend outside the village in which they operate the program.
of the participants are from the ineligible group. We exclude them from our estimation.
This triple-di¤erence estimator allows us to compare the e¤ect of micro…nance participation on eligible clients (in a treatment village) relative to eligible non-clients from a control village. It also provides a cleaner way to separate out some of the bias from the di¤erential growth e¤ects that may be caused by gaps in initial characteristics.
To alleviate concern regarding comparability of the treatment and control groups,
we use a non-parametric matching strategy. In particular, we use the propensity score matching (PSM) of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to clean out observable heterogeneity prior to using the triple-di¤erence estimator. Selection of variables for the propensity score is a crucial step in the estimation of treatment e¤ects. In identifying the set of control variables to estimate propensity score we …rst consider the variables (e.g., household and village characteristics) that the MFIs use to select a household and that are likely to determine household demand for credit. We include all the variables that may a¤ect both participation and potential outcomes (see the Appendix for variables used in estimating the propensity score). Using the …rst cross-section observation, we estimate a standard logit model where dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a household is a client of a MFI and 0 otherwise. The empirical distribution of the estimated odds-ratio of clients and non-clients shows that there are very few regions of non-overlapping support.
We impose a tolerance level on the maximum propensity score distance to improve the quality of matching. We apply a variant of caliper matching (see Dehejia and Wahba 2002) called radius matching. We use only as many comparison units as are available within the caliper. This matching estimator automatically imposes the common support condition and avoids the risk of bad matches. Therefore, households from the untreated group are chosen as matching partners for treated households that lie within the caliper.
Observations closer to the treated group were given heavier weight. We use the biweight kernel and weights are given to each observation by the following kernel formula: 
Impact on "newcomers" and "leavers"
The heterogeneity in the participation status over the 8 years of the survey enables us to examine the impacts that are likely to vary with the duration of participation in a micro…nance program. This consideration is important since a MFI may just attempt to enhance the short-term bene…ts of its borrowers, and not focus on long-term bene…ts, to gain popularity and to expand its program. Therefore, short-term program evaluation is likely to compromise the gains that accrue if the program continues to provide microcredit over a long period. Thus, we examine whether households who participate for longer periods bene…t more compared with those participating for shorter periods. 17 Accordingly, 15 We also experimented with an approach following Crump et al. (2006) to limit comparisons to a trimmed sub-sample for which there is su¢ cient overlap in the propensity scores. The results are very similiar, and are available from the author on request. 16 The identi…cation is also based on the SUTVA assumption. For our identi…cation assumption to hold, we require eligible participants not to share their loan with eligible non-participants from the nonprogram villages. This is very unlikely given that there is now established literture which indicate that risk sharing in developing countries does not take place beyond the village level. So, such spillover is unlikely. Islam (2008) , using the …rst cross-section data of this program, does not …nd any evidence in support of any such spillover e¤ects. If the programs have any positive (nagative) e¤ect on ineligible households in later periods, then the impact estimates would be downward (upward) biased. 17 When we observe small impacts in the …rst few years of follow-up and small impacts at the end, we can be reasonably certain that extending the program to the control group would have yielded small impacts. When we observe large impacts at the end of the eight-year follow-up, we can be fairly con…dent that extending the program to the control group would have yielded still larger impacts. In those cases where impacts were large at the beginning and smaller at the end we have reason to speculate whether an eight-year embargo would have increased treatment e¤ects towards the end of the follow-up period.
we classify sample households into three broad categories:
1. continuing participants -clients in any MFI program throughout the survey period; 2. non-participants -did not participate ever in any MFI program (control group); and 3. occasional participants -found to be clients in one or more years but not the entire period.
We divide the occasional participants into the following categories: and (iii) eligible and have access to a program but have chosen not to participate. The …rst two groups do not lead any contamination bias in our estimates since they cannot get the treatment. However, the presence of the last group, eligible non-clients in the treatment village, means that there is potential selection bias since they choose not to participate. We exclude them in our estimate. We also exclude ineligible clients.
We estimate the long-term treatment e¤ect by comparing households who are continuing clients (for at least 8 years) to those who could never participate in the program.
The entry into the program by some households at a later period possess a challenge to evaluate the program because of concern regarding timing of the participation and the consequent selection bias. Discussion with houehold members indicate that many eligible households applied for the program later because they were not aware of the availability of the microcredit program, there were uncertainity over the eligibility status, and the waiting period to get the micro…nance loan. The program was also not available in all villages at the same time. We estimate the treatment e¤ects for the new participants under the identifying assumption that those who joined later in the program are systematically no di¤erent, conditional on observables and time-invariant characteristics, from those who joined earlier. We can further relax this assumption using the baseline information collected in 1997-98 for this group. For newcomers, the estimated impacts are based on the changes in outcome between baseline survey and outcome we observe during 2004/05 survey when they are clients of micro…nance. The estimates obtained using newcomers2 are termed as "short-term e¤ects,"while the corresponding estimates for newcomers1 are termed "medium-term e¤ects", considering their length of participation in micro…nance.
We consider leavers to examine whether the impacts of the program last beyond the period when the households left the program. However, it could be the case that those who bene…t most stay in the program while those who fail to gain immidiate bene…ts drop out, or viceversa. So, the estimated impact could either be over-or under-estimated if we exclude leavers from our analysis. Alexander-Tedeschi and Karlan (2006) argue that the cross-sectional impact estimates will be biased if we exclude drop-outs from the treatment group. We track drop-outs for up to 8 years post-program. Leavers1 left the program immediately after 1997/98 survey and did not participate in any other program since then.
Using their sample, we estimate the changes in outcome just before their departure from the program and the outcome in 2004/05 when are no longer participants. We refer to the resulting estimates as the long-run e¤ect. Similarly, estimates obtained using leavers2 are referred to as medium-run e¤ect. We argue that impacts occurring in subsequent years should add to the accumulated impact amounts (impact estimates for continuing clients) to measure the overall impact of participation in the program. respectively. However, there is very little or no impact on "other income."
Results: Double-and Triple-Di¤erence Estimates
However, if there was a distinct shock to the treatment villages over this period or if a MFI selects a village observing certain shocks in that village then this estimate does not correctly identify the impact of the treatment. We examine this in the righthand side of 18 We make two important assumptions here. First, there are no households who change their participation status twice between any two periods. Second, there is no dynamic sorting of households with high or low potential outcomes participating early or late in the program. If there is a dynamic sorting, then the duration of the participation in micro…nance or decisions of when to leave or to participate in the program is likely to depend on the unobserved potential outcomes perceived by households and not by us (researchers). Given that we have year-to-year information on the participation status of households, the …rst assumption can be reliably checked. The number of households who change their participation status twice is very low, and we exclude them in our estimation below. We argue that any remaining potential bias is adequately controlled by using a triple-di¤erence matching estimator. 19 The reported results are based on the …rst and last rounds of the survey. We use these two rounds because there was a ‡ood at the end of 1998 in Bangladesh, and many of the outcome variables could disproportionately be a¤ected by post- ‡ood rehabilitation programs, and damage from ‡oods. Although the 1999-2000 survey took place more than one year after the ‡ood, a shock of that magnitude is likely to have a fairly long-run impact on household behaviour and outcomes.
the Table 3 , where we perform the same exercise for the ineligible (non-treated) groups in both treatment and control villages (Columns 5 and 6, respectively). We …nd a slight decrease in food consumption and large reduction in assets, little increase in non-food consumption, but a signi…cant increase in income and self-employment income among ineligible households in the treatment village compared to the control village.
Taking the di¤erence between the two sides of Table 3 (Panel C, columns 1 & 5), there is 7 percent and 11.7 percent gain in food and non-food consumption, respectively, for continuing participants. The gain in self-employment income is 15.1 percent, and other income increases by 6.5 percent. There is a sharp increase in assets in the tripledi¤erence estimate, from 14.8 percent in the double-di¤erence estimate to 41.3 percent. This is largely due to a sharp fall in asset holdings in the comparison group of ineligible households. Thus, if the DDD strategy is taken to be more suitable than the DD strategy in separating out the treatment e¤ect of micro…nance, impact estimates are overstated for long-term clients in the case of self-employment income and non-food consumption, but understated in the case of income, food consumption and assets using the double-di¤erence method.
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The medium and short-term treatment e¤ects are reported in Table 4 . They are represented by the triple-di¤erence estimates for newcomers1 and newcomers2, as shown in left and right side of Table 4 , respectively. The estimates for the newcomers are obtained using the baseline information. The results show that newcomers2 enjoy a large increase in food consumption, while newcomers1 experience a moderate fall in food consumption. Combining food and non-food expenditure we observe an increase of expenditure for newcomers2 while a decline in expenditure for newcomers1. The estimated impact for newcomers1 indicates a smaller positive e¤ect on self-employment income and other income, and a large increase of non-land assets. newcomers2 also gain more self-employment income and other income. The exception is assets, where we …nd a large decline. While it is not obvious why consumption of newcomers1 are declining while their income is increasing, the results from Kaboski and Townsend (2005) and Banerjee et al. (2009) suggest 20 The reported standard errors are larger and this is partly due to non-parametric matching estimates, and partly due to smallenss of sample in each category. See Angrist (1998) and Zhao (2006) who compare the performance of matching and regression methods and …nd the former estimators have larger standard errors. In fact, we will see in the next section that a regression method of our approach that includes controls gives a tighter con…dence interval, and so the coe¢ cents become statistically more signi…cant. that such outcome are not unusual. Table 5 gives the triple-di¤erence estimates for leavers. The left-hand side shows the results of long-term leavers (leavers1) while the righthand side reports the results for medium-term leavers (leavers2). Here we compare leavers with those non-clients who would have dropped-out had they participated in the micro…nance. The implicit assumption is that the leavers have the same mean outcome as their counterparts in the control group who would have been drop-outs if they had been in the treatment group, and that any potential di¤erences between them has been controlled by the triple-di¤erence matching estimate. The results indicate that the impact estimates are positive for all outcome measures except for food consumption. The results indirectly indicate that drop-outs leave the program not because they are unsuccessful. Although it is not clear why these households dropped-out from the program, the descriptive statistics not reported here show no signi…cant di¤erence between leavers and continuing clients. It is likely that there are some unobserved factors that might predict why these households dropped-out.
Since we track these households over di¤erent periods, and compare their changes in outcome, we are able to take into account of many unobservables (including time varying).
In Table 5 , when we just compare two groups of leavers, the resulting impacts are very similar for these two groups except for assets. Leavers2 still have a sizeable increase in assets than their older counterpart, leavers1. This implies that the size of the e¤ects, beyond the years during which households were participants, is diminishing.
We also estimate the treatment e¤ects using a triple-di¤erence approach proposed by Ravallion, Galasso, Lazo and Philipp (2005) . According to the approach, we need to compare changes in outcomes of continuing participants and matched leavers, after netting out the outcome changes for a matched comparison group that never participated.
The estimation method requires the following steps: (1) calculate the …rst di¤erence between a continuing participant and a matched non-participant; (2) calculate the …rst di¤erence between leavers from the program and matched non-participants; (3) take the di¤erence of each of (1) and (2) at two points of observation; and (4) take the double di¤erences calculated in (3). In essence, this requires the subtraction of the doubledi¤erence estimates of continuing clients (Table 3 ) from the double-di¤erence estimate of leavers1 (Table 5 ). The resulting impact estimates are positive in all cases as shown in Table 6 . When compared to estimates obtained for continuing participants in Table   3 , we …nd impacts that are larger in the case of food consumption and smaller for all other outcome variables (see last column, Table 6 ). Since drop-outs from micro…nance are expected to receive partial treatment (e.g., due to the continuing return from an old investment project, or training received from an MFI) which could increase their income/assets, these triple-di¤erence estimates are likely to be understated. However, it also gives estimates of what drop-outs could have gained had they not left the program.
Triple-Di¤erence in Regression Framework
In order to increase the precision of triple-di¤erence estimates we use a regression framework. By adding controls, we hope to net out the in ‡uence of factors such as household age, gender, education and family composition, etc., that may have in ‡uenced the income, consumption and assets over the study period. We run the following reduced-form regression:
We present results for both the matched sample and the full sample in Table 7 This means that the treatment e¤ect of micro…nance is higher for continuing participation than occasional participants, which broadly supports our previous results. The estimated coe¢ cient is more precise using the regression framework than the non-parametric DDD matching estimation approach.
We argue that our results are also robust if there is any selection bias in terms of composition of leavers, newcomers and continuing participants since we are di¤erencing out any di¤erences that could exist in terms of outcome variables. In cross-sectional data, the di¤erence between groups is important and may invalidate the results. Moreover, using our …rst round of survey data, we …nd no signi…cant di¤erences between eligible groups in treatment and control groups in terms of either outcome or demographic variables. We do not provide these results here but they are available upon request.
Summary and Conclusion
This Our main conclusion is that the graduation from poverty using microcredit requires longer-term participation to achieve productive e¢ ciency or to generate higher returns from self-employment activities. Since existing members of micro…nance get larger loans by participating in a program over a longer-term, our results indirectly point out that MFIs may provide larger loans sooner rather than later-an argument recently put forward by Ahlin and Jiang (2008) .
One important implication of the present …ndings concerns the evaluation of micro…nance program. Conventional program evaluations that are based on the outcomes reported by continuing participants may underestimate the contribution of microcredit programs. Insofar as leavers from the program do reap bene…ts from their short-lived participation, these bene…ts ought to be included in the assessment of the value of any micro…nance program. The treatment e¤ect of microcredit is underestimated if we exclude the leavers since the total impact of a program is equal to bene…ts to continuing participants plus leavers. Another important implication of the this study is that shortterm e¤ects do not provide a robust foundation for determining the total program impact.
Using short-term treatment data in a microcredit program may yield biased conclusion regarding the overall impact of the program on participants.
Our results for leavers and newcomers are, however, subject to small sample problem.
There can still be a concern regarding selection bias for these groups despite our e¤orts to reduce such concern. The results are therefore indicative, and more research in this line is needed to draw an de…nitive conclusion. 22 Here we aim to tackle an important question in development economics, which has not been attempted so far. So, our paper is expected to generate more debate on this issue and bring further research on the impact of di¤erent-term participation in micro…nance.
22 Randomization might not help in this context, as it would be very di¢ cult to restrict some households to deny the program for certain periods once they participate. Also randomization over a substantial period of time is bound to be contaminated.
Appendix:
Variables used in the estimation of propensity score:
Household Level variables:
Age of household head, square of the age of household head, sex of household head, marital status of household head, education level of household head and spouse (illiterate, can sign only, can read only, can read and write), whether household head has spouse, highest grade achieved by a member in the household, total arable land owned by household, dependency ratio, number of 15-60 years old male and female member, number of daughters, sons, type of family (joint family or semi-nuclear, nuclear), dummies for occupation of the household head (farmer, agricultural labour, non-agricultural labour, self-employed or businessman, professional or salaried job holder, or any other job), if household has electricity connection, number of living room (beside bathroom/kitchen), if cement or brick is used in any of the living room, whether condition of house is good, liveable, or dirty, whether household has separate kitchen, toilet facility.
Village level Variable:
Presence or absence of primary school, secondary school or college, health facility, Adult male wage in the village, presence of brick-built road, regular market, post o¢ ce, local government o¢ ce, youth organization, distance to nearest thana, number of money lenders, large farmers/traders who provides advances against crops in the village, number of small credit/savings groups in the village, price of rice, wheat, oil, potato. + Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. The regressions include household demographic and socio-economic variables as controls. Standard errors presented in parenthesis are corrected for clustering at the village and year level, while those in brackets are corrected using block bootstrapping. The matched sample is based on the propensity score estimated using first cross-section data using a wider set of household and village level variables. 1 Estimated coefficient is based on random effect tobit model since fixed effects tobit are biased and inconsistent Double difference (treatment group) is obtained by subtracting column (2) from column (1). Triple difference is using ineligible households in program and control villages. Matching is done without replacement using caliper <.0005 (.005 for ineligible group). Observations with too high or too low values are omitted in the final estimation. The sample size changes slightly depending on the number of match available in each case. 1 clients who dropped out after the first round of the survey and remained non-participants since then; 2 households who remained participant until two years prior to 2004/05 survey, dropped out later and remained nonparticipants since then The sample size changes slightly depending on the number of match available in each case. Triple difference is using ineligible households in program and control villages. Matching is done without replacement using caliper <.0005 (.005 for ineligible group). Observations with too high or too low values are omitted in the final estimation. The sample size changes slightly depending on the number of match available in each case. and is derived by subtracting column (1) from column (2). The last column levelled as DDD is taken from previous estimates to compare results with column (3) (0.2221)** (0.2201)** (0.1775)** (0.1765)** N=1470 N=1397 N=2694 N=1874 Notes: + Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. Standard errors presented in parenthesis are corrected for clustering at the village and year level. The matched sample is based on the propensity score estimated from first cross-section data. A household is chosen in the matched sample if its propensity score lies within the probability distance of 0.0005 
